Award of Alimony

1. As stated in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b), and explained in Cox v. Cox, 335 N.J. Super. 465 (App. Div. 2000), courts may award one or more of the following types of alimony:
   
   
   1. Permanent
   2. Rehabilitative
   3. Reimbursement, or
   4. Limited Duration.
   
   In addition to the above four types of alimony, the court may also award Pendent Lite Alimony during the pendency of the divorce proceeding.



2. Marital fault is irrelevant to alimony except in two narrow instances: cases in which the fault negatively affects the economic status of the parties; and cases in which the fault so violates societal norms that continuing the economic bonds between the parties would confound notions of simple justice. Marital fault is irrelevant to a counsel fee award. Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70 (2005).



3. Law Lessons from MANI v. MANI (App. Div., A-4276-01T1, April 26, 2006, not approved for publication): N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23g authorizes courts to consider the proofs in establishing the grounds for divorce based on fault in determining an alimony award. However, except under very limited circumstances, it is not appropriate to consider marital fault in an alimony determination, and under no circumstances is marital fault an appropriate consideration in determining counsel fee awards. Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 91-95 (2005).



4. Law Lessons from Egan v. Egan (App. Div., Docket No. A-2124-03T1, November 3, 2005, not approved for publication):
   
   To have an impact on alimony, marital fault must "negatively affected the economic status of the parties," Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 90 (2005). "Where marital fault has no residual economic consequences, it may not be considered in an alimony award." Id. at 91.



5. Law Lessons from Schwartz v. Schwartz (App. Div., Docket No. A-6948-03T5, November 2, 2005, not approved for publication):
   
   Limited duration and permanent alimony reflect and validate "the important policy of recognizing that marriage is an adaptive economic and social partnership[.]" Cox v Cox, 335 N.J. Super. 465, 479 (App. Div. 2000). As contrasted with permanent alimony, limited duration alimony is awarded when "an economic need for alimony is established, but the marriage was of short-term duration such that permanent alimony is not appropriate." Id. at 476.
   
   Permanent alimony is generally reserved for "marriages of long duration where economic need is also demonstrated." Ibid. One of the statutory factors that is especially relevant when deciding whether to award limited duration or permanent alimony is the length of the marriage. Id. at 483. "All other statutory factors being in equipoise, the duration of the marriage marks the defining distinction between whether permanent or limited duration alimony is warranted or awarded." Ibid.
   
   Marriages lasting only two to three years can easily be recognized as non-deserving of permanent alimony. Hughes, supra, 311 N.J. Super. at 33. The difficult decisions arise in the context of "intermediate length" marriages, such as the ten-year marriage or a nine-year marriage. Ibid.
   
   Age is extremely significant in these matters because younger divorcees often enjoy better employment prospects than do older spouses who have been absent from the workforce for many years. Ibid.
   
   Generally, only spouses who are leaving lengthy marriages that involve "prolonged economic dependence and sustained contribution to [the] marital enterprise" are deemed "deserving" of permanent alimony. Gordon v. Rozenwald, 380 N.J. Super. 55, 66 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Cox, supra, 335 N.J. Super. at 483).
   
   A limited duration alimony award is acceptable when the dependent spouse made sacrifices for a relatively short-term marriage and possesses the current ability to return to the workforce. Cox, supra, 380 N.J. Super. at 483.



6. Law Lessons from Sobe v. Sobe, (App. Div., A-394-04T1, Decided October 28, 2005, not approved for publication):
   
   N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(13) provides that: When a share of a retirement benefit is treated as an asset for purposes of equitable distribution, the court shall not consider income generated thereafter by that share for purposes of determining alimony.  This point was also made clear in Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. 496, 504-05 (1990).
   
   
7. Law Lessons from CETIN v. CETIN (App. Div., A-2680-04T2, January 5, 2006, not approved for publication):
   
   In awarding alimony pursuant to a divorce decree, the trial court must “’consider and make specific findings’ under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23[b].” Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 25 (2000) (quoting Carter v. Carter, 318 N.J. Super. 34, 42 (App. Div. 1999)). The thirteen factors in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23b apply to all alimony awards. Subsection “c,” which directs the court to consider limited duration, reimbursement, and rehabilitative alimony when the court finds permanent alimony inappropriate, mandates that the same factors as relevant to an award of permanent alimony be considered. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23c. Subsections “d” and “e” identify scenarios where rehabilitative and reimbursement alimony are appropriate.
   
   Notwithstanding, “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit the court’s authority to award permanent alimony, limited duration alimony, rehabilitative alimony or reimbursement alimony, separately or in any combination, as warranted by the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case.” N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23f.



8. Law Lessons from TARANTINO v. TARANTINO (App. Div., A-952-04T1, March 10, 2006, not approved for publication):
   
   The goal in determining an appropriate alimony award is "to assist the supported spouse in achieving a lifestyle that is reasonably comparable to the one enjoyed while living with the supporting spouse during the marriage." Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 16 (2000). The standard of living experienced during the marriage is the "touchstone" of the alimony award, and its importance "cannot be overstated." Ibid. In making an alimony determination, the trial court should not merely consider the economic contributions of the parties but should recognize that "marriage is an adaptive economic and social partnership." Cox,  335 N.J. Super. at 479. This principle acknowledges that marriage is a joint enterprise and that the efforts of making a home, performing various personal services, and providing physical and emotional support are "'at least as essential to [the] nature and maintenance'" of the marital relationship as economic factors, and are therefore "'entitled to substantial recognition.'" Id. at 479-80 (quoting Sally F. Goldfarb, Marital Partnership and the Case for Permanent Alimony, 27 J. Fam. L. 351, 354-55 (1988-89)).

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