What is Domestic Violence
- Domestic violence is a legal term of art which defines a pattern of abusive and controlling
behavior injurious to its victims. The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -33]
incorporates by reference various criminal statutes, the violation of which may constitute an act of
domestic violence if committed against a person protected by the Act.
The previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant, including threats,
harassment and physical abuse must be considered in evaluating a domestic violence claim.
The domestic violence law was intended to address matters of consequence; and should not be misused to
to gain unfair advantage in ongoing domestic disputes or to resolve long term issues more appropriately
decided in divorce or other types of Family Part proceedings.
See Corrente v. Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. 243 (App. Div. 1995);
see also Litton v. Litton (Appellate Division, A-2054-04T2, October 6, 2005, not
approved for publication).
-
Instead of redefining prohibited conduct, the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act incorporates
[see N.J.S.A.
2C:25-19] the following criminal statutes:
(1) Homicide [N.J.S.A.
2C:11-1, et seq.]
(2) Assault [N.J.S.A.
2C:12-1] --
See
Additional Discussion Here.
(3) Terroristic threats [N.J.S.A.
2C:12-3]
(4) Kidnapping [N.J.S.A.
2C:13-1]
(5) Criminal restraint [N.J.S.A.
2C:13-2]
(6) False imprisonment [N.J.S.A.
2C:13-3]
(7) Sexual assault [N.J.S.A.
2C:14-2]
(8) Criminal sexual conduct [N.J.S.A.
2C:14-3]
(9) Lewdness [N.J.S.A.
2C:14-4]
(10) Criminal mischief [N.J.S.A.
2C:17-3]
(11) Burglary [N.J.S.A.
2C:18-2]
(12) Criminal trespass [N.J.S.A.
2C:18-3]
(13) Harassment [N.J.S.A.
2C:33-4] --
See
Additional Discussion Here.
(14) Stalking [ N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10]
----------
HOWEVER, the commission of any one of these acts does not AUTOMATICALLY
warrant the issuance of a domestic violence order.
-
State v. Townsend, ___ N.J.___ (2006); May 15, 2006 (A-112/113-04):
The battered women’s syndrome has become widely accepted as admissible evidence in
self-defense
cases because it has been determined to be useful in explaining conduct exhibited by battered women
toward their abusers.” State v. B.H., 183 N.J. 171, 183 (2005).
Although battered woman’s syndrome is not included as a psychological syndrome in the
Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, battering is considered “a potential
triggering event
for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.” Ibid.; see American Psychiatric Association,
Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 463-68 (4th ed. 2000); see also Lenore E.A. Walker,
Battered Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 321, 327 (1992).
An expert's education, training, and most importantly, experience, can provide a sound
foundation for
an opinion that a victim suffers from battered women's syndrome. See
Torres, 183 N.J. at 578-79
(noting police officer’s combined experiences of gang-member interviews, numerous hours of seminar
instruction, and multiple conversations with fellow officers qualified him to give expert testimony
on gang hierarchy, organization, and discipline); see also Rosenberg, 352
N.J. Super. at 403
(explaining that “evidential support for an expert opinion is not limited to treatises or any type
of documentary support, but may include what the witness has learned from personal experience”);
Bellardini v. Krikorian, 222 N.J. Super. 457, 462-63 (App. Div. 1988) (commenting “that an expert
may rely on his own knowledge, as well as on facts supplied to him by others”). Consequently, a trial
court may properly admitted expert testimony about domestic violence and the effects of
battering even though the victim had not been diagnosed as suffering from battered woman’s syndrome.
-
Law Lessons from
Pazienza v. Camarata (App. Div., Docket No. A-2873-04T5, approved for publication November 7, 2005):
"Because a
particular history can greatly affect the context of a domestic
violence dispute, trial courts must weigh the entire
relationship between the parties and must specifically set forth
their findings of fact in that regard." Cesare v. Cesare, 154
N.J. 394, 405 (1998). A defendant's prior abusive acts should
be considered "regardless of whether those acts have been the
subject of a domestic violence adjudication." Ibid.
"Therefore, not only may one sufficiently egregious action
constitute domestic violence under the Act, even with no history
of abuse between the parties, but a court may also determine
that an ambiguous incident qualifies as prohibited conduct,
based on a finding of violence in the parties' past." Id. at
402.
Due process requires that a finding of domestic violence be
based upon the act or acts of domestic violence alleged in the
complaint.
H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175
N.J. 309, 324-25 (2003); L.D.
v. W.D., Jr., 327 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1999); J.F. v.
B.K., 308 N.J. Super. 387, 391-92 (App. Div. 1998). "It
constitutes a fundamental violation of due process to convert a
hearing on a complaint alleging one act of domestic violence
into a hearing on other acts of domestic violence which are not
even alleged in the complaint." J.F. v. B.K., supra, 308 N.J.
Super. at 391-92. A due process violation can easily be avoided
by granting a party a reasonable adjournment if confronted by
new allegations at the time of trial in order to afford the
party an ample opportunity to meet the charges.
H.E.S. v.
J.C.S., supra, 175 N.J. at 324-25.
- Legal Lessons from
Kehoe v. Gerson
(App. Div., A-4054-04T3, November 30, 2005, not approved for publication):
The standard for proving
allegations of domestic violence is by a preponderance of the
evidence. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29a.
- Law Lessons from
DeGIULIO v. DeGIULIO
(App. Div., A-1486-04T3, December 5, 2005, not approved for publication):
The applicable standard for proving allegations of domestic
violence is by a preponderance of the evidence; the court
considers various factors, including the history of previous
domestic violence between the parties. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29a; Cesare, 154
N.J. at 400, 402-05; Roe v. Roe, 253 N.J.
Super. 418, 428, 432 (App. Div. 1992). A defendant's abusive
acts are to be considered "regardless of whether those acts have
been the subject of a domestic violence adjudication." Cesare,
154 N.J. at 405.
- Law Lessons from
NIEVES v. REECE
(Appellate Division, A-6122-04T1, June 21, 2006, not approved for publication):
A restraining order may not be issued under the Prevention of
Domestic Violence Act of 1991, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17- to -35 (the
"Act") unless
the judge finds that defendant committed one of the offenses
defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394,
400 (1998). Moreover, mere commission of the offence is not
enough by itself. Id. at 401-02. In addition, the judge must
consider the parties' history, previous threats and physical
abuse, as well as whether there is immediate danger to the
plaintiff. Ibid.; N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a).
- Return to the Domestic Violence
Topic
- Return to General Topic Index
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