Guide to "Family Law" in New Jersey

Paul G. Kostro, Esq.

 

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What are the Legal Consequences of Domestic Violence?

  1. Forfeit Weapons.


  2. The Court will ordinarily suspend an attorney who is convicted of an act of domestic violence. [ In re Magid, 139 N.J. 449 (l995) & In re Principato, 139 N.J. 456 (1995).]


  3. Law Lessons from State v. Haas (App. Div., Docket No. A-2772-04T5, Decided October 21, 2005, not approved for publication):

    The laudable purpose of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act is "to assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18; see Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 399-400 (1998). The Act is comprehensive and authorizes, inter alia, the entry of orders pertaining to the issues of child custody, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29b(11); parenting time, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29b(3); and risk assessments to determine whether a particular parenting-time arrangement constitutes a risk of harm to the child, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29b(3)(a) and -29b(3)(b).

    The Act further provides that when considering the terms of a restraining order, the court must consider, inter alia, "[t]he best interests of the victim and any child[,]" N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29a(4), and when "determining custody and parenting time the protection of the victim's safety[,]" N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29a(5). More specifically, courts are statutorily cautioned that "[p]arenting time arrangements shall not compromise any other remedy provided by the court by requiring or encouraging contact between the plaintiff and defendant." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29b(3).

    Violating the provisions of a domestic violence final restraining order (FRO) issued pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act subjects the violator to a charge of domestic violence contempt. N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9b.

    If the violator had a prior conviction for domestic violence contempt, the violator is then subject to the imposition of a minimum term of not less than thirty days' imprisonment. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-30.


  4. Law Lessons from FINAMORE v. ARONSON (App. Div., A-3689-04T2, approved for publication February 2, 2006):

    Orders defining a parent's right with respect to contact with his child are subject to future revision depending on a showing of changed circumstances. Voit v. Voit, 317 N.J. Super. 103, 121 (Ch. Div. 1998); see also Nufrio v. Nufrio, 341 N.J. Super. 548 (App. Div. 2001). Modification of the order may be appropriate if the moving party shows the modification requested is in the best interests of the child. Todd v. Sheridan, 268 N.J. Super. 387, 398 (App. Div. 1993); Mastropole v. Mastropole, 181 N.J. Super. 130, 136 (App. Div. 1981). Similarly, a restriction of, or condition placed upon, a parent's visitation rights, must also be controlled by the best interests of the child. Sacharow, 177 N.J. at 80. The child's "best interest" is fostered when both parents are involved with the child, assuring him of frequent and continuing contact with both parties. See N.J.S.A. 9:2-4.

    When parents are additionally involved in domestic violence, the need to protect the "non-abusive spouse" is one consideration to be weighed by the court when evaluating the entry of an order that impacts the parent-child relationship. The Act mandates the "order shall protect the safety and well-being of the [victim of domestic violence] and minor children and shall specify the place and frequency of parenting time. Parenting time arrangements shall not compromise any other remedy provided by the court by requiring or encouraging contact" between the parties. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29b(3). While striking this balance the court must keep sight of the benchmark of the best interest of the child. Sacharow, 177 N.J. at 80.


  5. Law Lessons from: BHARADWAJ v. LENDZIOSZEK (App. Div., A-3423-04T3, March 3, 2006, not approved for publication):

    Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29, the judge of the Family Part hearing the complaint for domestic violence may issue an order granting any or all of the relief set forth in the statute depending on the circumstances surrounding the complaint. However, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29a makes clear that "[a]n order issued under this act shall only restrain or provide damages payable from a person against whom a complaint has been filed under this act and only after a finding or an admission is made that an act of domestic violence was committed by that person."

    The statutory remedies granted by the Act do not empower the court sua sponte to order the destruction of personal property of a domestic violence complainant. Although N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29b(9) authorizes the court to grant either party temporary possession of specified personal property defined therein, neither that provision nor any of the other seventeen provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29b authorizes the court to order the destruction of property.


  6. Law Lessons from STATE v. M.I. (App. Div., A-4498-04T1, April 25, 2006, not approved for publication):

    N.J.S.A. 2C:25- 30 provides that "[A] violation by the defendant of an order issued pursuant to the [Domestic Violence] Act constitutes an offense under subsection b. of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9."

    The State need only prove that the [Restraining] order was in existence at the time of the alleged contempt and it was not obeyed. State v. Sanders, 327 N.J. Super. 385, 387 (App. Div. 2000). "[I]t is irrelevant in a criminal contempt proceeding whether the temporary restraining order in effect at the time of the violation is later vacated or dismissed and no permanent restraint issues." Ibid.

    A court may reject a Defendant's claim that he did not comprehend or appreciate the meaning of the restraints. Cf. State v. Mernar, 345 N.J. Super. 591, 594 (App. Div. 2001) (remanding a criminal contempt action for sworn testimony regarding defendant's alcoholism and possible state of inebriation when he was allegedly handed the TRO).


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